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James Madison wrote four accounts of faction, the most public and famous of 
which was Federalist 10. By examining all four accounts, I undertake to develop a more 
capacious understanding of the design and purpose of Madison’s vision for American 
constitutional politics than can be extracted from an examination of Federalist 10 alone. I 
attempt to collate the unique insights of each account of faction into a coherent unity, 
with special attention to Madison’s rhetoric. I conclude that the three least famous ac-
counts of faction, correctly read, perfect and extend the account in Federalist 10 by offer-
ing a more candid window into Madison’s thought on human beings and the political life 
for which he thought them fit. 
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Federalist Number 10 has figured prominently in the consciousness of students of 
American government as a remarkably diagnostic account of the working of American 
national representative politics. The illustration of national politics in that account exhib-
its a Tocquevillian prescience with respect to the workings of the government, and an au-
thoritative, if deliberately incomplete or partial, insight into the logic and theoretical 
foundations of that political order from the architect of that order, James Madison. For 
students of the American Founding, continued close readings of Federalist 10 raise as 
many questions as first, second, and even third readings appear to put to rest. What un-
derstanding of human beings underlies Federalist 10? What understanding of political 
life? What purposes did the author intend his account to serve? What light does the ac-
count shed on the character, functioning, and purposes of American government? 
In order to lay the groundwork for answering such questions, one must investigate 
the rhetorical character of Federalist 10. Federalist 10 was a public presentation of a nov-
el argument for the adoption of the proposed Constitution. As Federalist 10 was written 
for public consumption, one might suppose that, whatever its theoretical merits or charac-
ter, one of its rhetorical purposes, if not its primary rhetorical purpose, was to persuade. 
To persuade whom of what? To persuade its immediate audience–––the citizens of the 
state of New York–––of the merits of a proposed ―plan of government‖ in the run-up to 
the state ratification conventions. Its rhetorical intent, then, would seem to be emphatical-
ly political: an act of public intervention calculated to cause a specific political effect or 
to contribute to a specific political outcome, namely, the adoption of the Constitution. Of 
course, when a writer’s intent is political, one cannot expect his writing to exhibit com-
plete theoretical candor, especially when his writing is addressed to a skeptical audience. 
This is not to say that writers are never completely forthright about their fundamental un-
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derstanding of their subject in such circumstances, but that, for the rhetorical purpose of 
persuading a specific audience to perform a specific action, they are rarely so. And nei-
ther is this to say at the outset that Madison necessarily wrote anything that he understood 
to be false or inaccurate in Federalist 10, nor is it to preclude the possibility that he in-
tended Federalist 10 to be both a civically educative and uniquely insightful account of 
the workings of American government for subsequent generations. But a plausible and, as 
I hope to show, conclusive, hypothesis is that Federalist 10 obscures the complete theo-
retical candor of its author. 
Fortunately, there is not only a way to test this hypothesis, but also a means, if not 
of extricating Madison’s deepest and most private thought, which, ultimately, may have 
accompanied him to the grave, of at least arriving at a more capacious understanding of 
his thought on the problem of faction and the mechanisms by which American govern-
ment would ameliorate it. Between April and October 1787, Madison wrote three docu-
ments, each of which appears at first glance to be a draft of the account of faction that 
would appear in Federalist 10 on November 23 of that year. The first is a document enti-
tled ―Vices of the Political System of the United States‖ (hereafter ―Vices‖) that Madison 
composed in April in preparation for the convention in Philadelphia. The second is con-
tained within an address he gave to the Philadelphia Convention on June 6. I have for 
purposes of this paper relied upon Madison’s own summary of that account as recorded 
in his notes from that day. The third and final account developed prior to Federalist 10 is 
embedded in an October 24 letter to Thomas Jefferson.  
Each of these accounts a version of Madison’s thought on faction because while 
they all share a common core of arguments about faction, each addresses different sub-
jects and proffers new positions that Madison does not repeat in the others. Now a ver-
sion is a species or type of thing rather than an improvement or correction of that thing, 
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as a draft or iteration would be. Each of these three documents is a version rather than a 
draft because the often subtle differences in logic and emphasis between the documents 
are mutually compatible rather than contradictory. Indeed, more than compatible, the dif-
ferences logically supplement one another and combine to paint a complex portrait of the 
system some of whose aspects Madison clearly thought were necessary, and others that 
the unelaborated logic of his arguments requires, to obviate the problem of faction. Thus 
in the analysis that follows, I do not pretend always to speak for Madison. But I do hold 
that the conclusions I develop from his thought, as he presents it throughout the four ver-
sions, are consistent with and required by it. Finally, it is by assembling the differences 
between these accounts in one place that I hope not only to expound Madison’s full diag-
nosis of and solution to the problem of faction, but also to lay the groundwork for an-
swering the questions posed at the beginning of this work. For in working through Madi-
son’s accounts of this the quintessential ill of representative government, one is able to 
witness glimpses of Madison’s understanding of human beings and the political life for 
which he thought them to be fit. 
There is much overlap between all four accounts of faction. To minimize repeti-
tion I have collated the arguments and rhetorical progressions common to each version 
into what I will call the common framework of Madison’s account of faction. After ex-
pounding the common framework, I will delve into the peculiar elaborations and qualifi-
cations of that framework each version contributes. Finally, I will attempt briefly, in light 
of the detailed examination that precedes it, to recount the salient contours of Madison’s 
thought on the primary subjects his analysis implicates.  
Before I lay out the common template, however, a brief word about the public or 
private character of each version is in order. Two of the versions, the June 6th convention 
speech and Federalist 10, were written for and delivered to skeptical audiences, both of 
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whom Madison was exhorting to specific, albeit disparate, paths of action. As such, I be-
lieve, and hope to show, that the ruminations I earlier presented on the political intent of 
Federalist 10 apply additionally to Madison’s convention address. The other two versions 
were written for private audiences. Madison sent a copy of the Vices to George Washing-
ton, who would go on to serve as president of the Convention. But its form and substance 
indicate it was written as a brainstorm or outline of Madison’s still-developing private 
thoughts. The October 1787 letter to Jefferson exhibits a private character, divulging to 
Jefferson, along with a version of the author’s account of the problem of faction, his mild 
disappointment at the final product of the Philadelphia Convention, Convention gossip, 
and the identity of an anonymous pamphleteer. While not simply dispositive, these ele-
ments suggest that the contents of the letter were not intended for public knowledge, at 
least in Madison’s lifetime. Indeed, the private character of the Vices and Madison’s Oc-
tober 1787 letter to Jefferson accounts for their being less guarded and more revealing of 
the importance in Madison’s mind of certain elements of the argument he downplays in 
the public versions. In my analysis of the versions, I have not placed explicit weight on 
the public or purportedly private character of the audience to which it is addressed, since 
I believe the full logic of Madison’s account can show which of the points are the most 
crucial to the account’s success. I mean only to say that, as we will see, a preponderance 
of such points come from the private versions. Neither have I found it appropriate, to re-
peat, to afford too much weight to the chronological order of the versions as one draft 
improving upon the next. I intend to show that in light of the fullest logic of his account, 
Madison’s downplaying or omission of certain points from one version to the next is at-
tributable not so much to a change or revision in his thought as to the particular rhetorical 




THE COMMON FRAMEWORK OF THE ACCOUNTS OF FACTION 
The common framework begins by drawing the reader’s attention to the patholo-
gies of early American political life under the Articles of Confederation to which Madi-
son most imputes the need for a strong government of national scope: the injustice and 
the violation of individual rights committed or countenanced by the state governments.  
Such ills are caused by factions, which ―all civilized societies‖ must permit. A salient 
smattering of the kinds of factions found in the young American republics are credi-
tors/debtors, rich/poor, husbandmen/merchants/manufacturers, religious sects, ―followers 
of different political leaders‖ (Vices), ―inhabitants of different districts‖ and importantly, 
―owners of different kinds [species] of property.‖  Whenever a legislative majority forms 
on the basis of a shared sentiment or passion, it will threaten the rights and interests of 
minorities who do not partake of the majority. So powerful and universal is this tendency 
in representative governments that self-regulating restraints on the majority are insuffi-
cient to prevent this from occurring. There are four such maxims ―conventionally sup-
posed‖ to restrain majorities. The first is the standard or expectation of classical political 
virtue: ruling for the common good. While this ―prudent regard‖ should be of sufficient 
weight to restrain the majority from abusing the rights or interests of the minority, it ―is 
seldom heeded.‖ The second is ―honesty is the best policy.‖ But this rule is as little 
obeyed by individuals as by collectives of the same. The third is the majority’s concern 
for its own reputation or what Madison terms ―respect for character.‖  
While Madison quickly dispatches the first two restraints with one-line rebuttals, 
he devotes much more space exploring this third popular notion, which suggests he be-
lieves it has more currency or plausibility. This ostensible check is insufficient to curb 
majoritarian abuses for three reasons. The first is that the concern for the reputation of the 
collective held by each member of it is inversely proportional to the size of the collective. 
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As an association increases in size, each member becomes a smaller part, acquires a 
smaller influence over its decisions, and receives a smaller share of the praise and blame 
imputed to the association. Whereas a person largely controls his personal reputation with 
his own calculation and actions, as the member of a collective he can plausibly eschew 
much or all of the responsibility for its unpopular actions. Because of this fact, the analo-
gy between the constraint that an individual’s concern for his own reputation places on 
his behavior and the constraint that the concern he possesses for the collective of which 
he is a member places on his behavior as a member of that collective simply does not 
hold. The second reason that a concern for reputation is ineffective is that the majority 
sets the standards by which its behavior is to be judged. The reputation of collectives and 
individuals is the popular perception of the character and conduct of those entities. But 
the members of a majority aggregately reflect the character and the political preferences 
of their constituents. To the extent the former misbehave, then, they do so generally in 
accordance with the opinions and prejudices of the latter. Thus the majority cannot be 
relied upon to be an impartial judge of those cases in which its interests clash with the 
rights or interests of a minority. Self-interest and pride distort and even dictate one’s view 
of justice and the public good: rarely are the first two at odds with either of the last. 
The fourth and final undependable constraint on the majority is religion or con-
science, words Madison uses interchangeably. Religion suffers from the same problems 
as the presumed restraint of a concern for reputation: regardless of its effect in individual 
cases, it fails to restrain collectives. Indeed, conscience is an even less effective restraint 
on individuals than a concern for reputation; it is therefore an even smaller constraint on 
the behavior of collectives. As Madison puts it in two of the four versions: 
 
[t]he conduct of every popular assembly acting on oath, the strongest of religious 
Ties, proves that individuals join without remorse in acts, against which their con-
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sciences would revolt if proposed to them under the like sanction [the religious 
oath], separately in their closets (Vices, Letter to Jefferson). 
 
A separate and deeper problem with religion is that it is a ―passion;‖ while it can some-
times be ―kindled‖ into a popular ―enthusiasm‖ that can, for a short time, restrain the be-
havior of associations, its character precisely as a passion tends to inflame the collective 
psychology of individuals acting in concert. In such instances religion can serve as an 
equal motive for majorities to oppress minorities as to restrain themselves. 
Having surveyed a litany of social causes for faction in contemporary American 
governments, Madison proposes a remedy that he claims is the only solution consistent 
with the majoritarian spirit of those governments. That solution is what I will call for the 
rest of this work ―diversity republicanism.‖ Diversity republicanism is the ―great desider-
atum‖ or first purpose of American government. It consists in ―enlarging the sphere‖ or 
scope of government beyond those of the states to a national government that possesses 
large electoral districts. By virtue of the complexity and extent of the whole from which it 
draws, the officeholders of this central government will tend to represent a vastly greater 
heterogeneity of interests, passions, and views relative to the officeholders of state gov-
ernments. The smaller, more homogeneous settings of state legislatures help legislators to 
identify common interests, passions and views that can constitute the basis for assem-
bling majority coalitions to enact unjust policies that serve those interests, passions, and 
views. In contrast, the effect of the artificially heightened heterogeneity of views, pas-
sions and interests in the national government renders the process that occurs in the state 
governments more difficult, and ideally impossible, in the national government. The nec-
essary condition of oppression, namely a majoritarian interest, passion, or unjust policy, 
may or may not exist, but the sufficient condition of its being carried into action, namely 
a majority’s identifying it, will be less likely. The size of the national legislature is an ad-
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ditional impediment to a majority’s implementing oppressive designs, Madison avers, 
because the effect of a large relative to a small number of legislators is to decrease the 
possibility and obstruct the success of legislative cabals. The primary purpose of diversity 
republicanism, then, is to structure national elective political office so as to minimize the 
possibility of majoritarian factions forming in the national government and implementing 
legislation that harms the interests or violates the rights of minorities.  
The second purpose or ―auxiliary desideratum‖ of diversity republicanism is to 
increase the likelihood that the nation’s most competent and prudent persons will be 
elected to the national government. The very character of diversity republicanism and the 
size of national elective office secure this end. Participating in national office is most at-
tractive to persons of ―refined‖ and ―extended‖ views and least attractive to the parochial 
and narrow-minded persons for whom, in Madison’s view, the state governments are no-
torious. The cosmopolitanism of the designs and character of the national project tends to 
deflect from national channels the political ambitions of persons who do not share or en-
dorse that cosmopolitanism. Diversity republicanism thereby selects for officeholders 
who are partial to nationalism and who exhibit a political ambition that is necessarily 
greater than that of persons who prefer the political life of the states. As for the size of 
national elective office, Madison presents an explicit account of how larger electoral dis-
tricts increase the odds of higher-quality candidates only in Federalist 10, but it is possi-
ble to infer this logic from every version. The voting population of any given electoral 
district is roughly proportional to the number of qualified persons for political office in 
each district. Smaller districts may therefore contain only a few or no such qualified per-
sons; larger districts will contain a greater and more conspicuous population of such per-
sons. The larger the district, therefore, the greater the number of prudent and rational 
candidates who can seek national elective office, that that district will contain. Together I 
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call these two rhetorically subordinate aspects of Madison’s accounts of faction the meri-
tocratic leadership filters of diversity republicanism. 
So concludes the common template. Thus far there is nothing we could not have 
known from reading Federalist 10, and indeed the template necessarily omits much in 
Federalist 10 that Madison does not develop in his other versions. I will now detail the 
singular insights of each. To begin, then, with the Vices of the Political System of the 
United States: this document contains a list and discussion of twelve items which can be 
divided into two parts. The first is comprised of items 1-10 and 12. The second is item 
―11. Injustice of the laws of the States‖ or the first version of Madison’s diagnosis of and 
solution to the problem of faction. Because Madison identifies faction as the primary 
cause of the need for amending the Articles of Confederation, and because many of the 
other items are alluded to or subsumed by Madison’s accounts of faction, I will confine 
myself in this work to examining item 11 of the Vices. This is not to say those items that 
Madison does not explicate in his accounts of faction are unimportant, but that they merit 
a robust and dedicated analysis that would considerably expand the scope of this work, 
and that I will therefore not attempt to shoehorn here. 
 
THE VICES 
In the Vices, Madison makes a distinction that he does not reiterate or elaborate in 
any of the subsequent versions. This distinction concerns the cause of injustice and op-
pression in the state governments, which he elsewhere attributes to unbridled factions 
simply. In the Vices, Madison first identifies an alternate source apart from factions 
(what he calls, in this version, ―the people themselves‖): the character of persons who 
tend to aspire to political office. These persons can be motivated by three things: ambi-
tion, self-interest, and the public good, and ―[u]nhappily the two first are proved by expe-
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rience to be most prevalent.‖ Because they are motivated by their own good, the most 
self-interested office holders are the hardest working and thus the most successful. The 
invariable result is that self-interested legislators predominate in legislative leadership 
positions and have an outsized influence on the activities of legislatures. Such legislators 
actually possess different views and interests from those of their constituents, and these 
legislators succeed in retaining office only by cloaking their ―base and selfish measures, 
by pretexts of public good and apparent expediency.‖ These persons succeed in winning 
over the mass of ―honest but unenlightened representative[s]‖ which, like the general vot-
ing population, lacks the discernment to see its leaders for the wolves they are and not the 
shepherds they dissemble. This line of thought emphasizes and illustrates in greater depth 
another crucial vice, the poor quality of state legislators, that diversity republicanism is 
intended to correct or ameliorate by directing persons of cosmopolitan and enlightened 
views to national office. One can expect very few competent and virtuous legislators for 
every dozen narrowly self-interested, petty demagogues, and diversity republicanism’s 
large electoral districts offer a better promise of containing at least one of the former to 
compete with the latter for a national office. Additionally and more profoundly, this por-
trait of legislative activity suggests that Madison thought that there would always be an 
insoluble tension or divergence of interest between the people and their elected represent-
atives, even at in the national government, despite or perhaps precisely because of its 
meritocratic structural filters. To the extent that diversity republicanism offers a channel 
and filter for great political ambition, the persons who partake of national elective office 
will likely differ in perspective, temperament, opinion, and capacity from their constitu-
ents, perhaps in ways that improve the quality of government but detract from its repre-
sentativeness. This impression is subsequently confirmed in the letter to Jefferson. 
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The second unique insight of the Vices arises from Madison’s elaboration upon 
the discussion of the inefficacy of a concern for reputation on legislatures’ behavior. Pub-
lic opinion is the same as the opinion of the majority. Although individuals of ―extended 
views, and of national pride,‖ will elevate the quality of the nation’s policies to the ap-
probation of foreign powers, the concern of the ―people at large of the Country‖ for the 
opinions of other persons is inversely proportional to the geographic remove of those per-
sons. 
 
Is it to be imagined that an ordinary citizen or even an assemblyman of R[hode] 
Island in estimating the policy of paper money, ever considered or cared in what 
light the measure would be viewed in France or Holland; or even in 
Mass[achusetts] or Connect[icut]? It was a sufficient temptation to both that it 
was for their interest: it was a sufficient sanction to the latter that it was popular in 
the State; to the former that it was so in the neighbourhood. 
 
This remark elucidates more clearly the conundrum diversity republicanism is designed 
in part to ameliorate. The majority’s propensity to abuse minorities’ rights and disregard 
minorities’ interests is a real and abiding problem in Madison’s eyes, but here we see the 
first indication that faction is not so much the efficient as the proximate cause of injustice 
and the young country’s acute political ills. The efficient causes are the majority’s lack of 
wisdom and, to the extent it lacks wisdom, its unfitness to rule. While Madison explicitly 
links paper money to individual property rights and thus the injustice of faction, his 
treatment highlighting the reputation among foreign and even other state governments of 
the American states not for rights abuses but imprudent and myopic policies suggests that 
a lack of endemic wisdom is a deeper and more intractable problem for democracies, in-
dependent of their tendency to violate the rights of minorities. It is only by referring to an 
external view of the factious injustice of the states that Madison is able to indicate, albeit 
subtly, that the profounder problem is a lack of wisdom within them. 
 12 
The final unique insight of the Vices is the analogy Madison develops between 
the relation of an extensive republic to a limited monarchy and that of a traditionally con-
ceived republic to an unlimited monarchy.  The considerable advantage of a limited mon-
archy to an absolute one is the presence of one or more rival political institutions that act 
as intermediaries between the monarch and the people. The institutions act as dykes 
against and channels of the power the monarch would otherwise exert on the people di-
rectly, often to the people’s detriment. As dykes they frustrate and as channels they mold 
the monarch’s power. Thus a limited monarch is largely prevented from enacting policies 
adverse to the interests of the people. The advantage of an extensive republic over a tradi-
tional one is similar in effect if not form. The traditional republic is exemplified by the 
Greek city-states of antiquity and the Roman Republic: a polity with a small territory and 
a homogeneous, familiar, and virtue-oriented population. The distinctive political feature 
of the traditional republic is the plenary vestment of sovereignty in a deliberative assem-
bly. No constitutional restraint and no rival institution can negate a majority vote of the 
assembly. For Madison, the American states are analogues of traditional republics and the 
national government is the analogue of an extensive republic. The advantages of an ex-
tensive republic over a traditional one, then, are the meritocratic leadership filters and 
faction-obviating scope of diversity republicanism that curtail the unwise democratic ad-
ministration not uncommon to, and the rights abuses prevalent in, traditional republics.  
The foundational principle of republicanism is that ―the majority who rule in such 
Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights.‖ Tradi-
tional republics eliminate the quintessential political vice of unlimited monarchies, name-
ly, the prerogative and propensity of the monarch to distinguish between his good and 
that of his subjects, and exploit the latter putatively in the interest of the former.  A popu-
lar base in the government spares republics this inconvenience. Instead, the republic’s 
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quintessential flaw is its tendency to sacrifice the good of the minority to that of the ma-
jority. Diversity republicanism corrects this flaw by ―modif[ying] [the] sovereignty‖ of 
republics to produce conditions of political restraint that in their operation approximate 
the institutional restraints on a limited monarch. Diversity republicanism thereby prevents 
―one part of the Society from invading the rights of another‖ while the principle of tradi-
tional republicanism prevents the government or rulers ―from setting up an interest ad-
verse to that of the whole Society.‖ 
We can explicate several crucial insights from the Vices. The most important rev-
elation is that Madison is cognizant of and grappling with a dilemma at the core of politi-
cal philosophy: procuring wisdom in political life. From his reflections on this considera-
tion we can draw three inferences. The first is that Madison decides to confine his pro-
posals and theorizing to the only regime palatable to modern sensibilities, democracy. He 
never countenances an alternative and clearly wishes to preserve the integrity of, and en-
sure a central role for, the ―republican principle‖ or majority rule. However, in so doing, 
Madison recognizes democracy tends to empower unwise leaders: the factious spirit of 
self-interested and vicious officeholders, while perhaps one of the more conspicuous 
democratic pathologies, is at bottom a symptom of the profounder disease of a lack of 
wisdom in political life. At first glance, it appears Madison’s solution to the problem of 
faction is intended merely to curb the excesses of factions rather than to prevent factions 
altogether. Yet the Vices contemplates an ―auxiliary desideratum‖ of attracting persons of 
cosmopolitan sensibilities and great political ambition to the national government. Such 
personal qualities, while intrinsically beneficial to the national government, serve also as 
imperfect or partial proxies for the politically desirable characteristic of reason or wis-
dom. Finally, Madison’s extended analogy between the two types of monarchies and re-
publics suggests that the preponderance of his solutions to the political ills of his time 
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will be institutional in character, and thus quintessentially modern. The Vices starkly 
demonstrates that its author is convinced that a new technology of politics is necessary, 
though not necessarily sufficient, for restoring the plausibility of popular rule and salvag-
ing its reputation from the ―opprobrium under which it has so long labored‖ (Letter to 
Jefferson). 
 
THE CONVENTION ADDRESS 
We hear echoes of these themes in Madison’s June 6, 1787 address to the Consti-
tutional Convention in Philadelphia. His speech cannot be isolated from those that pre-
ceded it, so I will briefly summarize them, as they were recorded in his notes. Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney opens the day’s business by moving to debate Resolution Four of 
the Virginia plan, which determines the mode of electing representatives to the first 
branch of the national legislature. Pinckney suggests that the states should make the ap-
pointment; Elbridge Gerry agrees. Gerry remarks that the example of the state govern-
ments demonstrates that democracy threatens liberty, and the ―worst men‖ often get into 
the state legislatures. Somewhat ironically in light of this thought, Gerry then states that 
he believes allowing the state legislatures to make the appointment would ―secure more 
effectually a just preference of merit.‖ James Wilson retorts that government should pos-
sess the strength and ―the mind or sense‖ of the people. He opines that large districts tend 
to preclude bad elections; in an identical thought to Madison’s, he declares that abuses 
―proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to in-
trigue themselves into office.‖ Roger Sherman speaks up to argue that if the state gov-
ernments are not to be abolished, there must be some kind of federalism or harmony be-
tween the state and the national governments. He then makes a remark that directly paves 
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the way for Madison’s intervention. Sherman suggests, in the short-hand of Madison’s 
notes, that the objects of union are  
 
1. defence ag[ain]st. foreign danger, 2. ag[ain]st. internal disputes & a resort to 
force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations, 4. regulating foreign commerce, & drawing 
revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confeder-
ation of the States necessary. All other matters civil & criminal would be much 
better in the hands of the States.  
 
Sherman concludes that ―the people are more happy in small than in large States,‖ while 
conceding that ―[s]tates may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too sub-
ject to faction.‖ Colonel Mason suggests that ―proper elections‖ and superior delegates 
are more likely to issue from popular elections of the first branch of the national legisla-
ture rather than from appointment of national legislators by the state legislatures. 
Now Madison speaks. He begins by arguing in favor of Resolution Four as writ-
ten since democracy in at least one branch of government is a ―clear principle of free 
gov[ernment].‖ Properly regulated, a system of popularly elected national government 
will produce ―better representatives‖ and diminish the influence or meddling of the states 
in the central government. But a national government would have more purposes than 
Sherman suggests. Its additional objects would be to provide for the ―security of private 
rights‖ and a ―steady dispensation of justice.‖ Threats to ―republican liberty‖ and the fail-
ure of the state and central governments to procure the two additional, and in Madison’s 
mind, primary ends of government, ―had more perhaps than anything else produced this 
convention.‖ Addressing Sherman’s advocacy of state legislatures appointing delegates to 
the national legislature, Madison attempts to turn one of Sherman’s observations against 
the Connecticut delegate’s position. Sherman, Madison says, had admitted that in very 
small states ―faction & oppression w[ould] prevail. It was to be inferred then that wher-
ever these prevailed the State was too small.‖ Abuse exists in both the largest and small-
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est states. The Convention is ―thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the na-
ture of the Gov[ernment] would admit.‖  
There are several problems with this rhetorical progression. In trying to enlist 
Sherman’s observation that very small states can be prone to faction against Sherman’s 
argument that state legislatures should appoint delegates to the national legislature, Madi-
son disregards Sherman’s more general contention the people in smaller states are happi-
er than people in larger ones. While Madison’s notes do not record Sherman as offering 
reasons or evidence for this, Sherman’s opinion alludes to a conventional defense of tra-
ditional republicanism. That argument is that for republics to function well and conduce 
to the human flourishing for which their most famous citizens are renowned, they require 
small populations and geographic territories. Although not explicitly confronted with this 
challenge to his project, Madison could certainly have extricated and made an effort to 
refute it. Instead he offers an implicit argument against this view with a problematic if not 
unsupported inference: ―wherever [faction and oppression] prevailed the State was too 
small.‖ This conclusion ignores the possibility of a small state with little faction and op-
pression (Sherman’s home state of Connecticut, for example); that of a state so large or 
diverse that its people enjoy less flourishing and its political life less stability than do the 
equivalents in smaller societies, of which, admittedly, Madison’s historical vantage point 
would not have afforded him many examples; and that of a large state whose government 
is nonetheless dominated by faction and oppression, which Madison explicitly counte-
nances in the sentence following his inference. 
We must not assume that Madison was unaware of these problems. Rather, they 
suggest that his rhetorical strategy is to educate rather than deliberate with his audience, 
to shift its attention from a myriad of republican possibilities to one whose choiceworthi-
ness he is persuaded of but which he is aware nonetheless exhibits characteristics to 
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which his audience would object, perhaps fatally for his plan. Madison’s concession in 
this speech that faction is a problem in large as well as small states, for instance, suggests 
that the dyke of diversity republicanism protecting the national government from the seas 
of factious oppression is not as watertight as his surface presentation indicates. Thus, 
while it is clear Madison believes that the advertised primary effects of diversity republi-
canism will meet the standard of necessity for solving the problem of faction, it does not 
alone meet the standard of sufficiency. From what we have seen thus far of Madison’s 
rhetorical method in these few introductory remarks of the June 6th speech, the logic of 
his statements concerning the psychology of popular opinion, and the lack of wisdom in 
the general population, we are led to conclude that Madison does not seek a completely 
thorough and sincere debate, even among the relatively outstanding intellects of the Con-
vention, on the merits of his proposal. What we have here for the first time are strong in-
dicators that the interaction or kinship between Madison’s rhetorical method in propagat-
ing his modern form of republicanism and his view of human nature is the key to unlock-
ing the full design and implications of his project. 
From his riposte to and problematic inference from Sherman’s speech, Madison 
delves into his second version of the diagnosis of and solution to the problem of faction. 
Little differs from the common template until he discusses the inefficacy of conventional-
ly supposed constraints on factions. In the spirit of other delegates’ frequent recursions to 
historical argument, he suggests that his ―observations‖ on the failure of these restraints 
are confirmed by three examples of ancient and recent history. The first is the colonialism 
of Greece, Rome, and Carthage of their respective colonies; the second is the colonialism 
of Britain of her American colonies; and the third is slavery in the United States. The 
source of American resistance to British colonialism was American national interest and 
pride: ―G[reat] Britain had a separate interest real or supposed, & if her authority had 
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been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expence.‖ But the real light this 
excerpt sheds on the object and trajectory of Madison’s national project of diversity re-
publicanism comes from his remark on slavery. ―We have seen the mere distinction of 
colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive do-
minion ever exercised by man over man.‖ Just as Great Britain had a separate interest 
from that of her colonies which could be prosecuted at their expense, so American slave-
owners have a separate interest from that of their slaves, which is pursued to the absolute 
oppression of the latter. What could be a more appropriate or more compelling example 
of a majority’s abusing the rights of a minority than American slavery? The juxtaposition 
of the egregious injustice of slavery to that of Britain’s exploitation of the American col-
onies suggests that America’s peculiar institution is the factious oppression of precisely 
the kind that any political system which is designed to dispense justice and protect minor-
ity rights must address. 
The final salient novelty of Madison’s June 6th speech is the phrasing of the first 
effect of diversity republicanism. The only solution to the problem of faction  
 
is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number 
of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the 
same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of 
the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in case they sh[ould] have such an inter-
est, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. 
 
In the other versions of this statement, Madison claims that diversity republicanism will 
preclude a majority from feeling or identifying a common interest or passion around 
which it can unite to oppress a minority. Here, he signals that diversity republicanism will 
function in a deeper sense than by merely preventing recognition of a possible shared mo-
tive for oppression, by instead transforming the majority’s interest and rendering it com-
mensurate with, or one and the same as, that of society as a whole.  
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This is a wholly new portrait of the workings of diversity republicanism. Madison 
does not spell out its contours, or by precisely what logic a ―divided‖ society is less likely 
to produce legislative majorities that will oppress minorities. Nor is it clear why, ―in the 
2d. place,‖ once a majority has recognized a common interest whose pursuit would op-
press minorities, it would be any less ―apt‖ to pursue it. The whole prior presentation of 
diversity republicanism (and for the matter, the overwhelming subsequent portrayal of the 
same) emphasizes the occlusion of the majority’s process of interest-recognition by a 
plausible if not empirically proven political logic. The unanswered questions this new 
phrasing raises, combined with Madison’s earlier problematic inferences and his deflec-
tion of a pregnant opportunity to engage in a debate over the comparative merits of small 
and large republics, are yet further indicators Madison is engaged in a rhetorical strategy 
to persuade his audience of the advantages of his proposed system rather than to expound 
it wholly in one place with total theoretical candor. Thus the first implication we can 
draw from the convention address is the support it lends the hypothesis animating our in-
vestigation into Federalist 10 through an examination of its preceding versions. The se-
cond insight is connected to the first. Reconciling this hypothesis with Madison’s demon-
strated awareness of the problem of the lack of wisdom in democratic political life we 
first saw in the Vices suggests that his rhetoric has as its end political persuasion, or, to 
do justice to its role in his project as a whole, education. Madison’s decision to attempt to 
educate his audience rather than to deliberate with it exposes his judgment of the rational 
faculties of most persons, even such eminent and superior persons as were members of 
the Philadelphia Convention, as, to anticipate Federalist 10, ―fallible.‖ His constitutional 
statesmanship, comprised of his constitutional vision and the rhetoric with which he at-
tempts to attract support to that vision, is therefore linked to his theoretical reflection on 
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the rational capacities of human beings, and the array of ills, political and private, which 
imperfections in those capacities engender. 
In light of the above, revisiting the remarkable claim with which Madison begins 
his convention address evinces its educative purpose. Where he does not actually instruct, 
he pointedly reminds his audience that the end of good government is the protection of 
―republican liberty‖ and individual rights. This reminder reveals Madison’s confidence 
that his constitutional proposals are the best means to those ends. Finally, Madison une-
quivocally signals that slavery is in the crosshairs of any constitutional project whose 
ends he has adumbrated. But he does not spell out the manner in which diversity republi-
canism alone, to the extent he has so far elucidated it, can provide a solution to slavery. 
Whites in slave states have already recognized their status as a majority and if not their 
common property interest, then certainly their common security interest in preserving 
slavery. How then can diversity republicanism eradicate it? 
 
THE LETTER TO JEFFERSON 
If Madison has thus far built an arch whose legs do not quite meet, he supplies its 
keystone in his October 24 letter to Jefferson. This correspondence, perhaps due to its 
character as the most private of the four writings, is unique in the degree of its theoretical 
candor, though also somewhat perplexing in its failure to adumbrate points that, in light 
of that candor, one would expect to be more fully explained. The crucial missing piece of 
Madison’s plan of government appears not in his third account of faction, but in the fram-
ing of that account within the letter. One of the purposes of the letter is to update Jeffer-
son, who at the time of its composition was the Confederation’s envoy to France, on the 
debates and output of the Philadelphia Convention which had adjourned the month previ-
ous. To that end, Madison discusses the direct and unmediated relationship between the 
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national government and the citizens of the states; the consequent ―change in the princi-
ple and proportion of representation‖ in the national legislature; the executive; and the 
Senate. He then reaches the question, fiercely contested at the Convention, of ―the due 
partition of power between the General & local Governments,‖ that is, of the locus of 
sovereignty in the proposed political regime. 
Madison emphatically contends that every political system must either unambigu-
ously locate sovereignty in the central government or, if forced by political necessity to 
divide sovereignty between the central and ―subordinate‖ governments, provide the for-
mer with a ―controuling power‖ with which it may deflect encroachments from the sub-
ordinate entities on its exclusive legislative domains and prerogatives. Both historical and 
theoretical reasons prove this necessity. Historically, the characteristic political danger of 
confederations has been the harm from member states to the confederation’s integrity and 
unity and not any harm, frequently spoken of at the Convention and in the state ratifica-
tion debates, from the central government to the rights of the member states and the 
states’ inhabitants. At a theoretical level, the problem is one of distinguishing supposedly 
different powers and domains of power. Presaging a conflict at the core of the political 
development of federalism, Madison notes, for example, that ―[t]he line of distinction 
between the power of regulating trade and that of drawing revenue from it, which was 
once considered the barrier of our liberties, was found on fair discussion, to be absolutely 
undefineable.‖ Similarly, the Montesquieuian categories of executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers, ―though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist in many 
instances of mere shades of difference.‖ If the boundaries of power between the different 
institutions of government are so ambiguous as to be reasonably contested by those insti-
tutions, it follows that the boundaries between wholly distinct governments that nonethe-
less possess coincident and in some cases identical powers and legislative domains will 
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be the cause of much more acrimonious and heated contestation. This jealousy will be 
especially acute on the part of the states for reasons we have already seen. When the cen-
tral government acts in domains it shares with the states, the latter ―will be continually 
sensible of the abridgement of their power, and be stimulated by ambition to resume the 
surrendered portion of it‖ just as ―the representatives of Counties and Corporations in the 
Legislatures of the States, [will be] much more disposed to sacrifice the aggregate inter-
est, and even authority, to the local views of their constituents, than the latter to the for-
mer.‖ 
So Madison locates the root cause of the prospective ills of American federalism 
in a lack of wisdom by pointing to the unbridled myopia and narrow self-interestedness 
endemic to state politics. The meritocratic leadership filters and faction-obviating size 
and heterogeneity of diversity republicanism solve these problems in the national gov-
ernment. But these benefits of diversity republicanism require a large, diverse political 
jurisdiction and large electoral districts. The states lack the requisite level of heterogenei-
ty and size. The only way, therefore, in which the effects of diversity republican can be 
brought to bear on the states, is through the regulation of states’ affairs by an external 
power that exhibits those effects. Here then, is the final piece of Madison’s project of ra-
tional democratic administration in the United States: not just a parchment commitment 
to national supremacy, but a constitutional politics of national supremacy rooted in the 
explicit constitutional prerogative of the national government to oversee the legislation of 
the state governments. With due credit to Michael Zuckert, and to appropriate his appel-
lation, I will call this crucial component of Madison’s vision for constitutional politics, 
though missing from the Constitution, corrective federalism. 
The form of corrective federalism Madison envisioned, and sought fervently at 
the Philadelphia Convention, was a plenary veto power over state laws vested in the na-
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tional legislature. The locus of corrective federalism that would ultimately develop in the 
United States, namely, in the judiciary, Madison rejects as both impractical and unlikely.  
 
[I]t is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law than to declare it void after 
it is passed; [] this will be particularly the case, where the law aggrieves individu-
als, who may be unable to support an appeal ag[ain]st a State to the supreme Judi-
ciary; [and] a State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would 
not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them[.] 
 
For these and other reasons, the national government needs the explicit power to void 
state laws. 
Corrective federalism perfects Madison’s vision for constitutional politics. If the 
purpose of diversity republicanism is to impede factious majorities from invading the 
rights of minorities, it is not sufficient that the national government be free of faction. 
Instead, the national government must have the power and the will to prevent factious 
abuses in the state governments. To bring this analysis full circle, consider once more the 
factious cleavages Madison enumerates in the common template. A striking omission is 
that between states. Yet he does include a cleavage between ―inhabitants of different dis-
tricts.‖ What are the most politically salient of such districts in the United States? The 
name of the polity tells us the answer. While factions continue to ravage state politics 
they will make states dangerous to the national government. Thus to the mechanisms of 
nationalism and diversity republicanism must be added corrective federalism. Corrective 
federalism solves the riddle by eradicating in the state governments the effects of the dis-
ease which the first two can contain only in the national government. 
Madison delivers a few remarks on the general theoretical rationale for this dy-
namic institutional, rather than merely parchment, solution to the problem of enduring 
political pathologies endemic to a polity. Specific safeguards against particular evils do 
not correct the structural tendency of the political system to enact unjust policies but only 
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―suppose[] the disposition which will evade it.‖ The legislature will find an ―infinitude of 
[] expedients‖ by which to circumvent the spirit if not the letter of supposedly ironclad 
prohibitions on certain behaviors to which it is prone. For this reason, a political system’s 
inclination to peculiar kinds of injustice ―can only be controuled by some provision 
which reaches all cases whatsoever.‖ 
Now Madison’s comment on slavery in the June 6th Convention speech assumes 
its full significance. At the Convention Madison did not get his wish of a national veto 
over state laws, and because he did not, the structure of the project he devised and wished 
to implement differs crucially from that of the Constitution. Insofar as one of the purpos-
es of the Constitution was to structure power at the national level to obviate factions not 
just in the national legislature, but in American politics generally, the plan lacked an es-
sential tool for rooting out a problem that, while circumscribed to the state governments, 
would cascade into an existential challenge to that imperfect political order. The logic of 
Madison’s arguments suggests he may have foreseen as much, and sought a national gov-
ernment with the power to meet that contingency if it did occur, and ideally to obviate it 
in the first place. 
Subsuming item 10 of the Vices, Madison continues his third account of the prob-
lem of faction by calling Jefferson’s attention to ―the mutability‖ as well as the injustice 
of state laws. Here he again tips his hand, contending that the problem with the state gov-
ernments is not simply their being rife with faction and abusing the rights of minorities, 
but a lack of wisdom in their administration which arises partially from factions’ single-
minded pursuit of the private interests they represent, and partially from the parochial and 
middling character of the people who can attain state office in such small electoral dis-
tricts. Just as he made explicit in the Vices, the quality of most state legislators is such 
that they simply cannot be counted on to be in any degree wise or judicious, only narrow-
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ly calculating and self-interested. Madison confirms with his attack on the ―mutability‖ of 
state laws his previous indications that diversity republicanism would not only curb fac-
tion but would also better secure wisdom in public administration. 
He proceeds to unfold his account of faction, following the template closely. The 
next novel digression from the template is an extremely important one. While heretofore 
Madison has described the problem of faction as an empirical fact, a political given that 
must be dealt with, for the first time he inquires explicitly into its causes and the possibil-
ity of eradicating it at the source, rather than, as he has so far advised, containing its reach 
and ameliorating its effect. The most eligible alternative to a large republic, and the alter-
native that many opponents of the Constitution believe most capable of this possibility, is 
the traditional republic. The protection of minority rights in such a system is founded on 
―the idea, that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political 
rights; but that they have all precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every 
respect.‖ Such a ―case [] is altogether fictitious‖ as ―no society ever did or can consist of 
so homogeneous a mass of Citizens.‖ However, were such a homogeneity possible, the 
reasoning of the proponents of traditionally conceived republicanism ―would be conclu-
sive.‖ Then  
 
[t]he interest of the majority would be that of the minority also; the decisions 
could only turn on mere opinion concerning the good of the whole, of which the 
major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this voice 
could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed. 
 
The equality of political rights, opinions, and sentiments upon which such republics de-
pend is destroyed by the institution of private property, which necessarily entails an ine-
quality in the distribution of property because persons possess ―unequal faculties of ac-
quiring it.‖ Once persons own different amounts and species of private property, their 
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self-interest compels them to support policies that augment their personal wealth, and de-
feat those that do the opposite. From the most basic inequality in faculties of acquiring 
property arise the divisions around which factions coalesce: ―[t]here will be rich and 
poor; creditors and debtors; a landed interest, a monied interest, a mercantile interest, a 
manufacturing interest.‖ Madison terms these cleavages along which factions form ―natu-
ral distinctions,‖ as opposed to ―artificial ones,‖ which arise from ―accidental differences 
in political, religious, or other opinions, or an attachment to the persons of leading indi-
viduals.‖ 
Madison’s sociological account of the origins of factious cleavage turns on this 
last crucial dichotomy. His appellation for the first source of cleavage, differences in ma-
terial interest resulting from an inequality of property, is ―natural.‖ Though Madison does 
not expound this distinction, there are three plausible constructions of his use of the word 
―natural.‖ The first is that differences in property are natural because they are rooted in 
man’s innate or natural qualities: they arise from the diversity, that is, the inequality, of 
persons’ innate faculties of property acquisition. The second is that such differences are 
natural in the sense of being required or confined by necessity, as by laws of physics. In 
this view, the inequality of private property is a direct and necessary consequence of the 
protection of private property. The third is that differences in property interests entail a 
moral character or normative hue such that their preservation, i.e., the protection of pri-
vate property, is an end, if not the end, of society. All three of these constructions of natu-
ral seem to me to be consistent with Madison’s portrayal and demonstrated understanding 
of man and society. However, it is more than a little curious that Madison employs the 
term natural to describe facets of an institution which is itself radically conventional. 
Property does not exist, or certainly lacks regular and dependable protection, in the ―sav-
age state‖ or outside of ―civilized societies.‖ Additionally, persons would seem to arrive 
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ineluctably at a diversity of opinions, if not by differences in their innate faculties alone 
then in the interactions between those faculties and diverse environments or upbringings. 
Why then call property distinctions natural, especially when their artificial opposites, 
―accidental differences‖ in opinion, seem to be as much if not more natural, at least by 
the first two of the three criteria above? Madison’s dichotomy appears to hold up only if 
we take him to mean natural in the third sense. This realization unveils for us another 
prong of Madison’s rhetorical strategy, and an important insight into his understanding of 
the proper ends of government. 
Madison’s natural/artificial distinction is yet another attempt to educate rather 
than illuminate his audience, for he does not spell out the complex but important reason-
ing that underlies that distinction. Factions predicated on property are inevitable in a free 
society. Furthermore, such factions are good for society because their property interest 
binds them to the society which regulates, protects, and guarantees their private property. 
On the other hand, factions predicated on opinion often pursue objectives that do not 
align with the political health and even survival of society, especially when such opinions 
derive from religion or other species of passion. So in response to his original inquiry of 
whether it is possible to give a people the same interests and opinions, Madison con-
cludes that it is impossible to do the former but advisable and therefore possible, at least 
partially, to do the latter: a people can be instructed in the proper functions and ends of 
government, and a government properly constituted can direct their attention and energies 
into peaceful and therefore controllable if not wholly salutary channels. Finally, Madison 
shows that a delegitimization of factions based on passions or opinions is meant to fore-
stall a whole zone of irrational and potentially destructive political contestation: 
―[h]owever erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dissention and faction may appear to 
the enlightened Statesman or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of mankind who are 
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neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view them in a different light.‖ The 
contrast between the ―bulk of mankind‖ on the one hand and the ―enlightened Statesman‖ 
and ―benevolent philosopher‖ on the other, suggests that the success of factions based on 
opinion are attributable to the broader lack of wisdom in political life. So acute is the 
danger from this species of faction that Madison relies on a partially pedagogical or civic-
educational as opposed to a wholly institutional solution. While he generally and puta-
tively rejects the answer of a traditional republic to the ill of faction, here he sees fit to 
employ it as a lubrication of or aid to his otherwise predominately institutional solutions. 
Thus, as Jeffrey Tulis has observed, though Madison eschews the possibility of homoge-
nizing the opinions of Americans on a wide range of contentious issues through a com-
mon moral or civic education, he attempts to homogenize their opinion on the improprie-
ty of the government’s administration or regulation of competing moral or religious vi-
sions.  
At the same time as Madison attempts to eviscerate the power of such conflicts 
and confine their residue to private life, he indicates that diversity republicanism will also 
ameliorate the potential threat of religious sectarian strife, albeit, because of diversity re-
publicanism’s different purpose in doing so, according to a modified logic than that by 
which it obviates the problem of interest factions. 
 
In a large Society, the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that a 
common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less likely to 
be formed, by a majority of the whole. The same security seems requisite for the 
civil as for the religious rights of individuals. If the same sect form a majority and 
have the power, other sects will be sure to be depressed. Divide et impera, the rep-
robated axiom of tyranny, is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by 
which a republic can be administered on just principles. 
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Religious liberty finds its refuge in religious diversity. But when one considers the design 
of the policy Madison proposes, it becomes clear that religious liberty is a secondary ef-
fect of the solution to the problem of religious faction. That policy–––divide et impera––
–is a markedly negative rhetorical twist on his heretofore moderate illustrations of diver-
sity republicanism. Indeed, it is significant that he invokes this moniker for the first and 
only time in the context of the application of diversity republicanism to religious sects. 
The solution to that threat or possibility is to ensure a sufficient sectarian diversity such 
that no sect can comprise a majority and commandeer the levers of government to the 
detriment of other sects. But in what sense is there a ―dividing and conquering‖? To put it 
differently, who or what is performing the dividing and conquering? Diversity republi-
canism does not divide or conquer factions; it structures factions’ pursuit of their interests 
to check one another and to prevent factions from recognizing they could comprise a ma-
jority with an oppressive goal. And while diversity republicanism can achieve the former 
with respect to religious sects, it cannot achieve the latter where there is a sectarian ma-
jority, for a common religious identity is too salient to be hidden from those who share it. 
The dividing, therefore, must be performed by some safeguard for freedom of con-
science, which produces religious diversity, and the conquering must be carried out by 
some mechanism to ensure the supremacy of positive or secular law to religious dictates 
or aspirations. But the secular law can be supreme only if it can be made fully independ-
ent of and extricated from religious law. Hence we have Madison’s solution to the prob-
lem of religious faction which, though it possesses a similar structure to that of his solu-
tion to the problem of interest faction, is distinct in its delivery, purpose, and effect. In 
keeping with his overriding pedagogical and civic-educational intent, Madison mutes his 
presentation of the threat to political order from religious sects to teach simultaneously 
that religious contestation is wholly inappropriate in politics and that to the extent reli-
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gious contestation must occur, it should be confined to the venue that ensures its occurs 
least: private life. The purpose of Madison’s solution to religious faction is not judicious-
ly and fairly to administer what Madison views as the ultimately indeterminable compet-
ing claims of irrational fanaticisms but to shield the state and national governments from 
serving as the stage for such debates, and thereby to quarantine them from the manifold 
risk of religious conflict. The effect is to confine public debate to the secular plane of rea-
son, to exclude that of metaphysical speculation, to diminish in the long term the political 




Federalist 10 is an astounding work, the diligent exposition of whose genius 
would require many dozens of pages. Most readers of this work will be familiar with its 
structure, so even though its progression differs considerably from that of the common 
template, I will not recount it. Furthermore, as I believe I have helped illuminate much of 
the purpose and logic of the argument in Federalist 10 by examining the three preceding 
accounts, I will confine myself here to extracting from Federalist 10 three particularly 
salient insights that consummate my analyses of the themes explored in the previous ver-
sions.  
For a work that endeavors to explicate Madison’s full solution to the problem of 
faction, the most fitting place to begin in Federalist 10 is with its author’s famous defini-
tion of faction.  
 
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community. 
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This definition exposes and confirms a distinctively modern conception of political 
community. Madison’s emphasis on individual rights, his decision to invoke the notion of 
―the permanent and aggregate interests of the community‖ instead of the more traditional 
concept of a ―common good,‖ and his failure to provide a justification for or explanation 
of those important choices suggests that the definition, like so much of his rhetoric, has 
an educative rather than illuminative purpose. The definition teaches that citizens in a 
large and diverse society will not share a true common good, or much more than a few 
fundamental interests. A common good conventionally signifies a communal telos or end 
more encompassing than and ostensibly superior to the mere preservation of the commu-
nity. Following Enlightenment thought, Madison appears to believe that conceiving of 
the political community in such terms does more harm than good. Like many quotidian 
political locutions, ―common good‖ has no essential content but the particular moral vi-
sion for society of which the person who invokes it intends to persuade others. The politi-
cal effect of admitting its use is to invite interminable debate about the ends of society. 
Worse still, doing so affords theoretical grounds and practical encouragement to factions 
to attempt to impose their passionate private visions of morality, be they religious or sec-
ular, on the public administration. It is not only safer but also more accurate to think in 
terms of interests, of which there is only one that all citizens truly share in a large, diverse 
society. The only such common fundamental interest is the interest of every citizen in the 
protection of his economic, civil and political rights, whose expression will differ, and 
hence whose derivative private interests will differ, from those of other citizens. Every 
citizen, therefore, has a marked interest in the preservation of the government which pro-
tects his rights and adjusts and regulates his particular private interests. The true perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community, then, are the preservation of the govern-
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ment and the procuring of political conditions that best conduce to the endurance and 
health of that government, namely, the Constitution and diversity republicanism. 
For purposes of this work, the most illuminating passage in Federalist 10 is Madi-
son’s treatment of the ―latent causes of faction . . . in the nature of man‖ and their mani-
festations in political life. The first such cause is the diversity of man’s opinions. Madi-
son describes the origins of that diversity in a cryptic account whose logic, when drawn 
out, I believe can be expressed as follows. Man’s reason is fallible. But man relies on his 
reason to create his opinions; therefore man’s fallible reason creates false opinions. A 
connection exists between man’s ―reason and his self-love‖ or his pride such that he is 
proud of his reason and its products. Self-love or pride is a passion; this and other pas-
sions attach to and become bound up with opinion. Hence man exhibits a passionate at-
tachment to his opinions, even though they began as and ultimately remain flawed works 
of his imperfect reason. Disagreement with his opinions, even the benign attempt to cor-
rect or refine them, impugns his pride and is construed as a denigration of his reason and 
hence his capacity for self-rule. Man’s pride rallies his passions to defend his false opin-
ions as they would defend his very freedom, for the excellence of his reason constitutes, 
at bottom, his claim to self-rule and hence to freedom.  
This compelling portrait of the operation of man’s psyche points to two conclu-
sions. The first is that, as we have long seen, a preponderance of persons possessing falli-
ble rational faculties, or to say the same thing, a lack of wisdom, is the efficient cause of 
the worst species of faction and injustice in democratic political life. The second helps us 
to appreciate fully the fundamental form and objective of Madison’s rhetoric, of which 
before now we have had many examples but an incomplete understanding. Madison’s 
account of the psyche shows us that he has only obliquely discussed the lack of wisdom 
characteristic of democratic political life precisely because calling attention to it too une-
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quivocally or insistently is sure to impugn the pride and incite the passionate opposition 
and enmity of his audience. He therefore focuses the attention of his audience on a par-
ticularly conspicuous symptom of the more opaque underlying problem. By affording his 
audience the goal of eliminating faction and not one of obtaining wisdom, he respects its 
pride and sets its sights on an achievable objective the very pursuit of which, even if the 
objective is never perfectly attained, is salutary for political life.  In keeping with his rhe-
torical purpose of education rather than illumination, Madison thus finds a way to mini-
mize some of the effects of a lack of wisdom without drawing attention to its real charac-
ter and thus without being required to reveal to his audience the problems with its own 
unstated but apparently self-evident claims to political rule. 
If securing the coincidence of wisdom and politics is the foundational challenge to 
which Madison has been addressing himself, we see in his discussion of the second 
source of faction in man’s nature, or the inequality of property, that the primary end or 
―first object‖ of government is to produce rational persons who are more likely to possess 
the wisdom necessary for political rule. Echoing his treatment of this question in the let-
ter to Jefferson, Madison explains that ―[t]he rights of property‖ originate in ―the faculties 
of men‖ and that there is a diversity of, an inequality in, such faculties. So important are 
these faculties that their protection ―is the first object of government.‖ He then refers to 
―faculties of acquiring property,‖ and states that from the protection of the same ―the pos-
session of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results.‖ Initially it ap-
pears that Madison is referring to the same kinds of faculties throughout his discussion, 
but on closer inspection we see that he qualifies ―faculties‖ as ―faculties of acquiring 
property‖ only after he declares the first object of government to be the protection of 
man’s ―faculties‖ simply. The question, then, is whether by ―faculties‖ simply Madison 
means ―faculties of acquiring property‖ throughout his whole discussion or whether, by 
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some sleight of hand, Madison has only implied that ―faculties‖ simply are ―faculties of 
acquiring property‖ when they in fact entail something broader. This latter interpretation 
seems more plausible: why else would he begin to qualify ―faculties‖ consistently only 
after he has stated that their protection is the first object of government? The lesson we 
derive, once again, is an insight into Madison’s rhetoric. His surface presentation is a 
subtle modification of the conventional liberal argument that the end of government is the 
preservation of man’s property to the contention that the end of government is the protec-
tion of the faculties by which men acquire property.  But Madison’s plain words are sus-
ceptible of and indeed invite a much more radical construction of the purposes of gov-
ernment. If the first object of government is to protect man’s faculties or abilities, its role 
is much more central to his development and fulfillment as a human being, and its do-
main and reach is much broader, than if its end is to guarantee to its citizens the fruits of 
their acquisitiveness. The national government Madison envisions is at once more ration-
al and utilitarian in its effect, more invasive in its reach, more powerful in its design and 
more ambitious in its objects than any that has preceded it. 
 The final section of Federalist 10 that I will consider here is Madison’s portrayal 
of the way in which diversity republicanism will contain religious sectarian faction. We 
saw in the letter to Jefferson that Madison has been pondering ways to ameliorate this 
particularly dangerous threat, and that the logic of his analysis points to the need for con-
stitutional provisions for disestablishment and freedom of conscience. Yet there is no 
mention of those requisites in his treatment in Federalist 10. In the penultimate paragraph 
of that account, Madison claims the national government will function as a secular bul-
wark against the religious sectarian contagion of distinct regions of the country. Echoing 
the distinctive language with which he discusses religious passion in the common tem-
plate, Madison avers that ―[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within 
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their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the 
other States.‖ However, as we have seen, while the logic of diversity republicanism ap-
plied to religion, that is, the security or preservation of religious freedom through a diver-
sity of religious sects, protects the public councils from infection and domination by a 
specific religious sect, the electoral structure of diversity republicanism does not do so 
directly but requires provisions for disestablishment and freedom of conscience. Madi-
son’s failure in Federalist 10 to highlight the need for these crucial provisions, or even to 
present a more positive version his suggestion in the letter to Jefferson that religious fac-
tions must be managed by ―the reprobated axiom of tyranny,‖ confirms our initial hy-
pothesis that Federalist 10, at least in many regards, has a political and not an illuminat-
ing purpose. So too, finally, does Madison’s assertion that diversity republicanism will 
prevent religious ―conflagrations‖ throughout the states, when it is clear from the previ-
ous versions that such a task would be greatly aided by, if it did not outright require, cor-
rective federalism.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 From our examination of Madison’s four versions of the problem of faction we 
can deduce a number of conclusions that consummate the incomplete and partially rhetor-
ical treatment of faction with which we are most familiar in Federalist 10. Expounding 
and collating these conclusions are the first steps toward answering the questions that ap-
pear at the beginning of this work and were its initial theoretical impetus. The conclu-
sions that I have developed throughout this work and that I will highlight below are de-
rived from the complex interaction between Madison’s shifting rhetoric, his distinct audi-
ences, and the substance of his thought, and are not entirely extricable and intelligible 
outside of this network of relationships. Nonetheless, each encapsulates a crucial aspect 
 36 
of Madison’s project that must be considered in any cogent attempt to apprehend the log-
ical unity of his understanding of man and attendant vision for politics. 
 The most important insight of the foregoing inquiry is that Madison views a lack 
of wisdom, and not the prevalence of faction, as the fundamental pathology of American 
politics under the Articles of Confederation. His emphasis on faction is a rhetorical strat-
egy calculated to show a need for political mechanisms whose putative object is to curb 
faction but whose intended purpose and effect is to provide for wisdom in American pub-
lic administration. They do so in part by curbing factions, which creates the requisite po-
litical space for wise administration, but primarily by recruiting ―individuals of extended 
views, and of national pride‖ into the national government (Vices). Madison, however, 
opts to obscure the true character of the primary pathology of American political life. 
Man’s reason is fallible yet he is proud of his reason and passionately attached to his false 
opinions. A forthright diagnosis of the underlying cause of the country’s political ills, re-
gardless of its author’s intentions, would necessarily impugn the reason of his audience 
and its claim to participate in political life, virtually ensuring its enmity and resistance to 
his prescriptions. Hedging against this possibility while accruing support for his constitu-
tional vision accounts for the rhetoric he employs in every account of faction, public and 
private. The Vices and the letter to Jefferson, though private and therefore in many re-
spects less guarded with respect to the topics they traverse, nonetheless employ this fun-
damental rhetorical strategy. Finally, despite his seemingly undemocratic view of the un-
derlying pathology of American political life, Madison is still a democrat, although more 
for utilitarian than philosophic reasons: not only does a popular base in government en-
sure government will not neglect the rights and interests of the people, but also no other 
regime is palatable to the sensibilities of his audience. 
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 Because, at least in Madison’s view, reason or wisdom, not popular will, dictates 
political right, another important aspect of his constitutional project he downplays but 
nonetheless acknowledges is the sacrifice of representation to wise administration the re-
gime will entail. As we saw explicitly in the Vices, and as is apparent in every instance in 
which Madison touches upon the meritocratic leadership filters of diversity republican-
ism, wisdom, cosmopolitanism, and national ambition are not commonplace personal 
characteristics. Indeed, the whole logic of diversity republicanism is predicated on their 
being rare. The import of this fact for American national politics, then, is that they will be 
much less representative, less republican, than is implied by the unproblematic continuity 
between a modern republic and a traditional republic that Madison’s rhetorical portrait 
paints. To procure institutional filters that exclude average persons from political office is 
ultimately to confine such persons to private life and to restrict the regulation of their 
rights and interests, which is what will pass for politics in the new regime, to superior 
persons. Extrapolating from this fact, and adding to it Madison’s stringent rhetorical and 
institutional devices intended to bar opinion and religion from the realm of legitimate po-
litical contestation, Madison’s constitutional project contemplates a largely depoliticized 
polity, the energies and ambitions of whose citizens are emancipated to pursue their pecu-
liar private advantages. 
 Expounding the accounts of faction that precede Federalist 10 has also shown 
what the portrait of representative government in the latter lacks, and requires for its 
completion. The only hope of preventing the violence of faction and solving the problem 
of unwise public administration in American politics rests in a plenary power of correc-
tive federalism, which Madison tells us in the letter to Jefferson will be most effective in 
the form of a national veto over state laws. Because Federalist 10 is an account of the rep-
resentative politics of the Constitution, and because the Constitution lacks corrective fed-
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eralism, the account of and solution to faction in Federalist 10, however rhetorically con-
fident, is radically inadequate. So too, for reasons we just extricated, is Federalist 10’s 
portrayal of the capacity of diversity republicanism for quarantining religious sectarian 
contagion and eliminating religious sectarian strife. 
Finally, we have learned that Madison’s rhetoric and political project are inextri-
cably linked. His rhetoric is not only derived from the same science of man that produced 
his new technology of politics, but also an integral part of his political project. It is so in 
two ways. First, as we have already seen briefly in this section, Madison’s rhetoric is de-
signed to have a political effect: to win support for the Constitution while obfuscating the 
true design and purpose of the constitutional order. Second, his rhetoric serves as a civic-
educational or pedagogical supplement to his otherwise uniformly institutional solutions. 
Madison tries to give his audience a common opinion as to the proper ends of govern-
ment and the legitimate objects of political contestation, while purportedly eschewing any 
attempt to limit factious strife and increase political stability by homogenizing opinions 
in a large and diverse society. His rhetoric instills in us salutary opinions that his constitu-
tional order needs to function smoothly, while revealing the limit of his confidence in the 
capacity of institutions to procure good government and wise administration. Madison’s 
constitutional project, in the final analysis, requires an indigenous wisdom which he can-
not create or provide, but which he can only design institutions to select for in its mem-
bers and marginally encourage in the general population. We see in the end that Madi-
son’s rhetoric does not vary considerably between the public and the private accounts, but 
that each of the first three accounts traverses a number of unique topics whose considera-
tion is necessary to the full elucidation of the logic of the constitutional order Madison 





THE VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 
April 1787 
 
1. Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional requisitions. 
This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, 
results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the States and has been 
so uniformly examplified in every similar Confederacy, that it may be considered as not 
less radically and permanently inherent in, than it is fatal to the object of, the present Sys-
tem. 
 
2. Encroachments by the States on the federal authority. 
Examples of this are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen in almost every 
case where any favorite object of a State shall present a temptation. Among these exam-
ples are the wars and Treaties of Georgia with the Indians–The unlicensed compacts be-
tween Virginia and Maryland, and between Pena. & N. Jersey–the troops raised and to be 
kept up by Massts. 
 
3. Violations of the law of nations and of treaties. 
From the number of Legislatures, the sphere of life from which most of their 
members are taken, and the circumstances under which their legislative business is car-
ried on, irregularities of this kind must frequently happen. Accordingly not a year has 
passed without instances of them in some one or other of the States. The Treaty of peace–
the treaty with France–the treaty with Holland have each been violated. [See the com-
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plaints to Congress on these subjects]. The causes of these irregularities must necessarily 
produce frequent violations of the law of nations in other respects. 
As yet foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadverting on us. This mod-
eration however cannot be mistaken for a permanent partiality to our faults, or a perma-
nent security agst. those disputes with other nations, which being among the greatest of 
public calamities, it ought to be least in the power of any part of the Community to bring 
on the whole. 
 
4. Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other. 
These are alarming symptoms, and may be daily apprehended as we are admon-
ished by daily experience. See the law of Virginia restricting foreign vessels to certain 
ports–of Maryland in favor of vessels belonging to her own citizens–of N. York in favor 
of the same. 
Paper money, instalments of debts, occlusion of Courts, making property a legal 
tender, may likewise be deemed aggressions on the rights of other States. As the Citizens 
of every State aggregately taken stand more or less in the relation of Creditors or debtors, 
to the Citizens of every other States, Acts of the debtor State in favor of debtors, affect 
the Creditor State, in the same manner, as they do its own citizens who are relatively 
creditors towards other citizens. This remark may be extended to foreign nations. If the 
exclusive regulation of the value and alloy of coin was properly delegated to the federal 
authority, the policy of it equally requires a controul on the States in the cases above 
mentioned. It must have been meant 1. to preserve uniformity in the circulating medium 
throughout the nation. 2. to prevent those frauds on the citizens of other States, and the 
subjects of foreign powers, which might disturb the tranquility at home, or involve the 
Union in foreign contests. 
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The practice of many States in restricting the commercial intercourse with other 
States, and putting their productions and manufactures on the same footing with those of 
foreign nations, though not contrary to the federal articles, is certainly adverse to the spir-
it of the Union, and tends to beget retaliating regulations, not less expensive & vexatious 
in themselves, than they are destructive of the general harmony. 
 
5. want of concert in matters where common interest requires it. 
This defect is strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs. How 
much has the national dignity, interest, and revenue suffered from this cause? Instances 
of inferior moment are the want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization & 
literary property; of provision for national seminaries, for grants of incorporation for na-
tional purposes, for canals and other works of general utility, wch. may at present be de-
feated by the perverseness of particular States whose concurrence is necessary. 
 
6. want of Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions & laws against internal violence. 
The confederation is silent on this point and therefore by the second article the 
hands of the federal authority are tied. According to Republican Theory, Right and power 
being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous. According to fact and expe-
rience a minority may in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for the majority. 1. If the 
minority happen to include all such as possess the skill and habits of military life, & such 
as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third only may conquer the remaining two 
thirds. 2. One third of those who participate in the choice of the rulers, may be rendered a 
majority by the accession of those whose poverty excludes them from a right of suffrage, 
and who for obvious reasons will be more likely to join the standard of sedition than that 
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of the established Government. 3. Where slavery exists the republican Theory becomes 
still more fallacious. 
 
7. want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the Government of the Confederacy. 
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. 
The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a Political 
Constitution. Under the form of such a Constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a trea-
ty of amity of commerce and of alliance, between so many independent and Sovereign 
States. From what cause could so fatal an omission have happened in the articles of Con-
federation? from a mistaken confidence that the justice, the good faith, the honor, the 
sound policy, of the several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal 
to the ordinary motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals: a confi-
dence which does honor to the enthusiastic virtue of the compilers, as much as the inex-
perience of the crisis apologizes for their errors. The time which has since elapsed has 
had the double effect, of increasing the light and tempering the warmth, with which the 
arduous work may be revised. It is no longer doubted that a unanimous and punctual obe-
dience of 13 independent bodies, to the acts of the federal Government, ought not be cal-
culated on. Even during the war, when external danger supplied in some degree the defect 
of legal & coercive sanctions, how imperfectly did the States fulfil their obligations to the 
Union? In time of peace, we see already what is to be expected. How indeed could it be 
otherwise? In the first place, Every general act of the Union must necessarily bear une-
qually hard on some particular member or members of it. Secondly the partiality of the 
members to their own interests and rights, a partiality which will be fostered by the Cour-
tiers of popularity, will naturally exaggerate the inequality where it exists, and even sus-
pect it where it has no existence. Thirdly a distrust of the voluntary compliance of each 
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other may prevent the compliance of any, although it should be the latent disposition of 
all. Here are causes & pretexts which will never fail to render federal measures abortive. 
If the laws of the States, were merely recommendatory to their citizens, or if they were to 
be rejudged by County authorities, what security, what probability would exist, that they 
would be carried into execution? Is the security or probability greater in favor of the acts 
of Congs. which depending for their execution on the will of the state legislatures, wch. 
are tho’ nominally authoritative, in fact recommendatory only. 
 
8. Want of ratification by the people of the articles of Confederation. 
In some of the States the Confederation is recognized by, and forms a part of the 
constitution. In others however it has received no other sanction than that of the Legisla-
tive authority. From this defect two evils result: 1. Whenever a law of a State happens to 
be repugnant to an act of Congress, particularly when the latter is of posterior date to the 
former, it will be at least questionable whether the latter must not prevail; and as the 
question must be decided by the Tribunals of the State, they will be most likely to lean on 
the side of the State. 
2. As far as the Union of the States is to be regarded as a league of sovereign 
powers, and not as a political Constitution by virtue of which they are become one sover-
eign power, so far it seems to follow from the doctrine of compacts, that a breach of any 
of the articles of the confederation by any of the parties to it, absolves the other parties 
from their respective obligations,and gives them a right if they chuse to exert it, of dis-
solving the Union altogether. 
 
9. Multiplicity of laws in the several States. 
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In developing the evils which viciate the political system of the U. S. it is proper 
to include those which are found within the States individually, as well as those which 
directly affect the States collectively, since the former class have an indirect influence on 
the general malady and must not be overlooked in forming a compleat remedy. Among 
the evils then of our situation may well be ranked the multiplicity of laws from which no 
State is exempt. As far as laws are necessary, to mark with precision the duties of those 
who are to obey them, and to take from those who are to administer them a discretion, 
which might be abused, their number is the price of liberty. As far as the laws exceed this 
limit, they are a nusance: a nusance of the most pestilent kind. Try the Codes of the sev-
eral States by this test, and what a luxuriancy of legislation do they present. The short pe-
riod of independency has filled as many pages as the century which preceded it. Every 
year, almost every session, adds a new volume. This may be the effect in part, but it can 
only be in part, of the situation in which the revolution has placed us. A review of the 
several codes will shew that every necessary and useful part of the least voluminous of 
them might be compressed into one tenth of the compass, and at the same time be ren-
dered tenfold as perspicuous. 
 
10. mutability of the laws of the States. 
This evil is intimately connected with the former yet deserves a distinct notice as 
it emphatically denotes a vicious legislation. We daily see laws repealed or superseded, 
before any trial can have been made of their merits: and even before a knowledge of them 
can have reached the remoter districts within which they were to operate. In the regula-




11. Injustice of the laws of States. 
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove a want of wisdom, their injustice 
betrays a defect still more alarming: more alarming not merely because it is a greater evil 
in itself, but because it brings more into question the fundamental principle of republican 
Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians 
both of public Good and of private rights. To what causes is this evil to be ascribed? 
These causes lie 1. in the Representative bodies. 2. in the people themselves. 
1. Representative appointments are sought from 3 motives. 1. ambition 2. person-
al interest. 3. public good. Unhappily the two first are proved by experience to be most 
prevalent. Hence the candidates who feel them, particularly, the second, are most indus-
trious, and most successful in pursuing their object: and forming often a majority in the 
legislative Councils, with interested views, contrary to the interest, and views, of their 
Constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the latter to the former. A succeeding elec-
tion it might be supposed, would displace the offenders, and repair the mischief. But how 
easily are base and selfish measures, masked by pretexts of public good and apparent ex-
pediency? How frequently will a repetition of the same arts and industry which succeed-
ed in the first instance, again prevail on the unwary to misplace their confidence? 
How frequently too will the honest but unenlightened representative be the dupe 
of a favorite leader, veiling his selfish views under the professions of public good, and 
varnishing his sophistical arguments with the glowing colours of popular eloquence? 
2. A still more fatal if not more frequent cause lies among the people themselves. 
All civilized societies are divided into different interests and factions, as they happen to 
be creditors or debtors–Rich or poor–husbandmen, merchants or manufacturers–members 
of different religious sects–followers of different political leaders–inhabitants of different 
districts–owners of different kinds of property &c &c. In republican Government the ma-
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jority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent inter-
est or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations of 
the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals? Three motives only 1. a prudent 
regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the Communi-
ty. This consideration although of decisive weight in itself, is found by experience to be 
too often unheeded. It is too often forgotten, by nations as well as by individuals that 
honesty is the best policy. 2dly. respect for character. However strong this motive may be 
in individuals, it is considered as very insufficient to restrain them from injustice. In a 
multitude its efficacy is diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the 
praise or the blame. Besides, as it has reference to public opinion, which within a particu-
lar Society, is the opinion of the majority, the standard is fixed by those whose conduct is 
to be measured by it. The public opinion without the Society, will be little respected by 
the people at large of any Country. 
Individuals of extended views, and of national pride, may bring the public pro-
ceedings to this standard, but the example will never be followed by the multitude. Is it to 
be imagined that an ordinary citizen or even an assembly-man of R. Island in estimating 
the policy of paper money, ever considered or cared in what light the measure would be 
viewed in France or Holland; or even in Masst. or Connect.? It was a sufficient tempta-
tion to both that it was for their interest: it was a sufficient sanction to the latter that it 
was popular in the State; to the former that it was so in the neighbourhood. 3dly. will Re-
ligion the only remaining motive be a sufficient restraint? It is not pretended to be such 
on men individually considered. Will its effect be greater on them considered in an ag-
gregate view? quite the reverse. The conduct of every popular assembly acting on oath, 
the strongest of religious Ties, proves that individuals join without remorse in acts, 
against which their consciences would revolt if proposed to them under the like sanction, 
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separately in their closets. When indeed Religion is kindled into enthusiasm, its force like 
that of other passions, is increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But enthusiasm is on-
ly a temporary state of religion, and while it lasts will hardly be seen with pleasure at the 
helm of Government. Besides as religion in its coolest state, is not infallible, it may be-
come a motive to oppression as well as a restraint from injustice. Place three individuals 
in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of the others, and give to 
two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third? Will the latter be secure? The 
prudence of every man would shun the danger. The rules & forms of justice suppose & 
guard against it. Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the 
rights of one thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions & oppres-
sions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in little 
republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of 
the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse 
of a common interest or passion is less predominant in this case with the majority; but 
because a common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations 
less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken 
into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other, whilst 
those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and 
concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular States contrary to the pre-
vailing Theory, are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits. 
The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the Sovereignty as 
will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to controul 
one part of the Society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time suffi-
ciently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society. 
In absolute Monarchies, the prince is sufficiently, neutral towards his subjects, but fre-
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quently sacrifices their happiness to his ambition or his avarice. In small Republics, the 
sovereign will is sufficiently controuled from such a Sacrifice of the entire Society, but is 
not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it. As a limited Monarchy tempers 
the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a 
small Republic. 
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a 
process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest 
and noblest characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the prop-
er motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most capable to devise the 
proper means of attaining it. 
 
12. Impotence of the laws of the States 
 
EXCERPT OF JAMES MADISON’S NOTES OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION 
June 6, 1787 
 
Mr. Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved ―that the first 
branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the 
people;‖ contending that the people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Leg-
islatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they 
were to be excluded from all share in it. 
Mr. Rutlidge 2ded. the motion. 
Mr. Gerry.2 Much depends on the mode of election. In England the people will 
probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. 
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme: hence in Massts. the worst men get into the 
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Legislature. Several members of that Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. 
Men of indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare no pains, however dirty to carry their 
point agst. men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run 
into extremes. He was as much principled as ever agst. aristocracy and monarchy. It was 
necessary on the one hand that the people should appoint one branch of the Govt. in order 
to inspire them with the necessary confidence. But he wished the election on the other to 
be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was that 
the people should nominate certain persons in certain districts, out of whom the State 
Legislatures shd make the appointment. 
Mr Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Govt., but he wished that vigorous authori-
ty to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The Govt. ought to 
possess not only 1st. the force, but 2dly. the mind or sense of the people at large. The 
Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation is 
made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. The oppo-
sition was to be expected he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens of the 
States. The latter had parted as was observed (by Mr. King) with all the necessary pow-
ers; and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well exercised. The 
State officers were to be the losers of power. The people he supposed would be rather 
more attached to the national Govt. than to the State Govts. as being more important in 
itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made 
by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an 
opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office. 
Mr. Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Govts. the elections ought to 
be by the people. If the State Govts. are to be continued, it is necessary in order to pre-
serve harmony between the National & State Govts that the elections to the former shd. 
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be made by the latter. The right of participating in the National Govt. would be sufficient-
ly secured to the people by their election of the State Legislatures. The objects of the Un-
ion, he thought were few, 1. defence agst. foreign danger, 2 agst. internal disputes & a 
resort to force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4 regulating foreign commerce, & draw-
ing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confederation 
of the States necessary. All other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the 
hands of the States. The people are more happy in small than in large States. States may 
indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too subject to faction. Some others 
were perhaps too large, the powers of Govt. not being able to pervade them. He was for 
giving the General Govt. power to legislate and execute within a defined province. 
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States and not 
the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals. The case 
will be changed in the new plan of Govt. The people will be represented; they ought 
therefore to choose the Representatives. The requisites in actual representation are that 
the Reps. should sympathize with their constituents; shd. think as they think, & feel as 
they feel; and that for these purposes shd. even be residents among them. Much he sd. 
had been alledged agst. democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it 
was to be considered that no Govt. was free from imperfections & evils; and that improp-
er elections in many instances were inseparable from Republican Govts. But compare 
these with the advantage of this Form in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of hu-
man nature. He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the peo-
ple, if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper money had been 
issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State 
Legislatures then wd. not send to the Natl. legislature patrons of such projects, if the 
choice depended on them. 
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Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature by 
the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Govt. and that this mode under proper 
regulations had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of 
avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. He differed 
from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to 
be all the principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were certainly important 
and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effec-
tually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interfer-
ences with these were evils which had more perhaps than anything else, produced this 
convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abus-
es of it practised in some of the States. The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted that 
in a very small State, faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be inferred then that 
wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as 
well as the smallest tho’ less than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to 
enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Govt. would Admit. This was the only de-
fence agst. the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of 
Govt. All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, 
as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed the manufac-
turing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the follow-
ers of this political leader or that political leader—the disciples of this religious Sect or 
that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or pas-
sion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A pru-
dent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by experience to be as 
little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always dimin-
ished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Con-
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science, the only remaining tie is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large num-
bers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may become a motive to per-
secution & oppression. These observations are verified by the Histories of every country 
antient & modern. In Greece & Rome the rich & poor, the Creditors & debtors, as well as 
the patricians & plebeians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness. 
What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens 
& Carthage, & their respective provinces; the former possessing the power, & the latter 
being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it? Why was America so justly 
apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real 
or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our 
expence. We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened peri-
od of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. 
What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Has it 
not been the real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors have defrauded their 
creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of 
one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another 
species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by 
a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become inse-
cure. In a Republican Govt. the majority if united have always an opportunity. The only 
remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number 
of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same mo-
ment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in 
the 2d place that in case they shd have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the 
pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a 
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republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils wch. 
have been experienced. . . . 
 
EXCERPT OF LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON 
New York, Octr 24, 1787 
 
Dear Sir, 
Your favor of June 20 has been already acknowledged. The last Packet from 
France brought me that of August 2d. I have recd also by the Mary Capt. Howland the 
three Boxes for W. H., B.F. and myself. The two first have been duly forwarded. The 
contents of the last are a valuable addition to former literary remittances and lay me un-
der additional obligations, which I shall always feel more strongly than I express. The 
articles for Congress have been delivered & those for the two Universities and for Gen-
eral Washington have been forwarded, as have been the various letters for your friends in 
Virginia and elsewhere. The parcel of rice referred to in your letter to the Delegates of S. 
Carolina has met with some accident. No account whatever can be gathered concerning 
it. It probably was not shipped from France. Ubbo’s book I find was not omitted as you 
seem to have apprehended. The charge for it however is, which I must beg you to supply. 
The duplicate vol of the Encyclopedie, I left in Virginia, and it is uncertain when I shall 
have an opportunity of returning it. Your Spanish duplicates will I fear be hardly vendi-
ble. I shall make a trial whenever a chance presents itself. A few days ago I recd your fa-
vor of 15 of Augst. via L’Orient & Boston. The letters inclosed along with it were imme-
diately sent to Virga 
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You will herewith receive the result of the Convention, which continued its ses-
sion till the 17th of September. I take the liberty of making some observations on the sub-
ject, which will help to make up a letter, if they should answer no other purpose. 
It appeared to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to cherish 
and preserve the Union of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion was 
thrown out, in favor of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies. 
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any 
system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary ob-
servance of the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A compulsive 
one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calami-
ties to the innocent & the guilty, the necessity of a military force both obnoxious & dan-
gerous, and in general a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration 
of a regular Government. 
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of operating, 
on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing 
them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation. 
This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented themselves were 
1. to unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper stability in the Legislative de-
partments, with the essential characters of Republican Government. 2. to draw a line of 
demarkation which would give to the General Government every power requisite for 
general purposes, and leave to the States every power which might be most beneficially 
administered by them. 3. to provide for the different interests of different parts of the Un-
ion. 4. to adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small States. Each of these ob-
jects was pregnant with difficulties. The whole of them together formed a task more dif-
ficult than can be well conceived by those who were not concerned in the execution of it. 
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Adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and 
complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately 
prevailed as less than a miracle. 
The first of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing. 
On the question whether it should consist of a single person, or a plurality of co-ordinate 
members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of power, 
on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place. The plurality of co-
ordinate members had finally but few advocates. Governour Randolph was at the head of 
them. The modes of appointment proposed were various, as by the people at large—by 
electors chosen by the people—by the Executives of the States—by the Congress, some 
preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses—some a separate concurrent ballot, allowing 
to each a negative on the other house—some, a nomination of several candidates by one 
House, out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several other modifications 
were started. The expedient at length adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction 
to the members. As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during 
good behaviour—a considerable number would have done so in case an easy & effectual 
removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term, 
seven years for example, with a subsequent & perpetual ineligibility, or a short term with 
a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the first opinion were urged the 
danger of a gradual degeneracy of re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then 
a hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the in-
dependent exercise of the Executive authority. On the other side it was contended that the 
prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most dignified characters from 
aspiring to the office, would take away the principal motive to ye faithful discharge of its 
duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment would stimulate ambition to 
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violent efforts for holding over the Constitutional term—and instead of producing an in-
dependent administration, and a firmer defence of the constitutional rights of the depart-
ment, would render the officer more indifferent to the importance of a place which he 
would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the encroachmts of the 
Legislature of which he might again be a member. The questions concerning the degree 
of power turned chiefly on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the Legisla-
ture. An absolute appointment to all offices—to some offices—to no offices, formed the 
scale of opinions on the first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute nega-
tive, as the only possible mean of reducing to practice the theory of a free Government 
which forbids a mixture of the Legislative & Executive powers. Others would be content 
with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three fourths of both Houses. It was warmly 
urged that the judiciary department should be associated in the revision. The idea of some 
was that a separate revision should be given to the two departments—that if either object-
ed two thirds, if both, three fourths, should be necessary to overrule. 
In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the Government the questions, as they 
came within the first object, turned mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration 
of it. The different modes proposed were 1. by the House of Representatives. 2. by the 
Executive. 3. by electors chosen by the people for the purpose. 4. by the State Legisla-
tures.—On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good behavior to four 
years, through the intermediate terms of nine, seven, six, & five years. The election of the 
other branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial. 
The second object, the due partition of power between the General & local Gov-
ernments, was perhaps of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an entire 
abolition of the States; Some for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with a 
negative on the laws of the States; some for such a power without a negative; some for a 
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limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the majority finally for a limited power 
without the negative. The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated dis-
cussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. As I formerly intimated to you my 
opinion in favor of this ingredient, I will take this occasion of explaining myself on the 
subject. Such a check on the States appears to me necessary 1. to prevent encroachments 
on the General authority. 2. to prevent instability and injustice in the legislation of the 
States. 
1. Without such a check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the evil 
of imperia in imperio. If a compleat supremacy somewhere is not necessary in every So-
ciety, a controuling power at least is so, by which the general authority may be defended 
against encroachments of the subordinate authorities, and by which the latter may be re-
strained from encroachments on each other. If the supremacy of the British Parliament is 
not necessary as has been contended, for the harmony of that Empire; it is evident I think 
that without the royal negative or some equivalent controul, the unity of the system 
would be destroyed. The want of some such provision seems to have been mortal to the 
antient Confederacies, and to be the disease of the modern. Of the Lycian confederacy 
little is known. That of the Amphyctions is well known to have been rendered of little use 
whilst it lasted, and in the end to have been destroyed, by the predominance of the local 
over the federal authority. The same observation may be made, on the authority of Polyb-
ius, with regard to the Achæan League. The Helvetic System scarcely amounts to a con-
federacy, and is disguished by too many peculiarities, to be a ground of comparison. The 
case of the United Netherlands is in point. The authority of a Stadtholder, the influence of 
a Standing Army, the common interest in the conquered possessions, the pressure of sur-
rounding danger, the guarantee of foreign powers, are not sufficient to secure the authori-
ty and interest of the generality agst. the anti-federal tendency of the provincial sover-
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eignties. The German Empire is another example. A Hereditary chief with vast independ-
ent resources of wealth and power, a federal Diet, with ample parchment authority, a reg-
ular Judiciary establishment, the influence of the neighbourhood of great & formidable 
Nations have been found unable either to maintain the subordination of the members, or 
to prevent their mutual contests & encroachments. Still more to the purpose is our own 
experience both during the war and since the peace. Encroachments of the States on the 
general authority, sacrifices of national to local interests, interferences of the measures of 
different States, form a great part of the history of our political system. It may be said that 
the new Constitution is founded on different principles, and will have a different opera-
tion. I admit the difference to be material. It presents the aspect rather of a feudal system 
of republics, if such a phrase may be used, than of a Confederacy of independent States. 
And what has been the progress and event of the feudal Constitutions? In all of them a 
continual struggle between the head and the inferior members, until a final victory has 
been gained in some instances by one, in others, by the other of them. In one respect in-
deed there is a remarkable variance between the two cases. In the feudal system the sov-
ereign, though limited, was independent; and having no particular sympathy of interests 
with the Great Barons, his ambition had as full play as theirs in the mutual projects of 
usurpation. In the American Constitution The general authority will be derived entirely 
from the subordinate authorities. The Senate will represent the States in their political ca-
pacity; the other House will represent the people of the States in their individual cay. The 
former will be accountable to their constituents at moderate, the latter at short periods. 
The President also derives his appointment from the States, and is periodically accounta-
ble to them. This dependence of the General on the local authorities, seems effectually to 
guard the latter against any dangerous encroachments of the former; whilst the latter, 
within their respective limits, will be continually sensible of the abridgement of their 
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power, and be stimulated by ambition to resume the surrendered portion of it. We find the 
representatives of Counties and Corporations in the Legislatures of the States, much more 
disposed to sacrifice the aggregate interest, and even authority, to the local views of their 
constituents, than the latter to the former. I mean not by these remarks to insinuate that an 
esprit de corps will not exist in the National Government or that opportunities may not 
occur of extending its jurisdiction in some points. I mean only that the danger of en-
croachments is much greater from the other side, and that the impossibility of dividing 
powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions by dif-
ferent interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial, requires some 
such expedient as I contend for. Many illustrations might be given of this impossibility. 
How long has it taken to fix, and how imperfectly is yet fixed the legislative power of 
corporations, though that power is subordinate in the most compleat manner? The line of 
distinction between the power of regulating trade and that of drawing revenue from it, 
which was once considered the barrier of our liberties, was found on fair discussion, to be 
absolutely undefinable. No distinction seems to be more obvious than that between spir-
itual and temporal matters. Yet wherever they have been made objects of Legislation, 
they have clashed and contended with each other, till one or the other has gained the su-
premacy. Even the boundaries between the Executive, Legislative, & Judiciary powers, 
though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere 
shades of difference. It may be said that the Judicial authority, under our new system will 
keep the States within their proper limits, and supply the place of a negative on their 
laws. The answer is, that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law than to de-
clare it void after it is passed; that this will be particularly the case, where the law ag-
grieves individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal agst a State to the supreme 
Judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not 
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be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, 
which, in the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the new Consti-
tution meant to exclude as far as possible. 
2. A constitutional negative on the laws of the States seems equally necessary to 
secure individuals agst encroachments on their rights. The mutability of the laws of the 
States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so fla-
grant as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err 
in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness 
which produced the Convention, and prepared the Public mind for a general reform, than 
those which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the 
Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform therefore which does not make provi-
sion for private rights, must be materially defective. The restraints agst. paper emissions, 
and violations of contracts are not sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far as 
they go, they are short of the mark. Injustice may be effected by such an infinitude of leg-
islative expedients, that where the disposition exists it can only be controuled by some 
provision which reaches all cases whatsoever. The partial provision made, supposes the 
disposition which will evade it. It may be asked how private rights will be more secure 
under the Guardianship of the General Government than under the State Governments, 
since they are both founded on the republican principle which refers the ultimate decision 
to the will of the majority, and are distinguished rather by the extent within which they 
will operate, than by any material difference in their structure. A full discussion of this 
question would, if I mistake not, unfold the true Principles of Republican Government, 
and prove in contradiction to the concurrent opinions of the theoretical writers, that this 
form of Government, in order to effect its purposes, must operate not within a small but 
an extensive sphere. I will state some of the ideas which have occurred to me on the sub-
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ject. Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the 
sense of the majority, and operating within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case 
which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people 
composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but that they have 
all precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. Were this in reali-
ty the case, their reasoning would be conclusive. The interest of the majority would be 
that of the minority also; the decisions could only turn on mere opinion concerning the 
good of the whole, of which the major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a 
small sphere, this voice could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most accu-
rately managed. We know however that no society ever did or can consist of so homoge-
neous a mass of Citizens. In the savage state indeed, an approach is made towards it; but 
in that state little or no Government is necessary. In all civilized societies, distinctions are 
various and unavoidable. A distinction of property results from that very protection 
which a free Government gives to unequal faculties of acquiring it. There will be rich and 
poor; creditors and debtors; a landed interest, a monied interest, a mercantile interest, a 
manufacturing interest. These classes may again be subdivided according to the different 
productions of different situations & soils, & according to different branches of com-
merce and of manufactures. In addition to these natural distinctions, artificial ones will be 
founded, on accidental differences in political, religious, or other opinions, or an attach-
ment to the persons of leading individuals. However erroneous or ridiculous these 
grounds of dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman or the be-
nevolent philosopher, the bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, 
will continue to view them in a different light. It remains then to be enquired whether a 
majority having any common interest, or feeling any common passion, will find sufficient 
motives to restrain them from oppressing the minority. An individual is never allowed to 
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be a judge or even a witness, in his own cause. If two individuals are under the bias of 
interest or enmity agst. a third, the rights of the latter could never be safely referred to the 
majority of the three. Will two thousand individuals be less apt to oppress one thousand, 
or two hundred thousand one hundred thousand? Three motives only can restrain in such 
cases: 1. a prudent regard to private or partial good, as essentially involved in the general 
and permanent good of the Whole. This ought no doubt to be sufficient of itself. Experi-
ence however shews that it has little effect on individuals, and perhaps still less on a col-
lection of individuals, and least of all on a majority with the public authority in their 
hands. If the former are ready to forget that honesty is the best policy; the last do more. 
They often proceed on the converse of the maxim, that whatever is politic is honest. 2. 
respect for character. This motive is not found sufficient to restrain individuals from in-
justice. And loses its efficacy in proportion to the number which is to divide the pain or 
the blame. Besides as it has reference to public opinion, which is that of the majority, the 
standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be measured by it. 3. Religion. The ineffi-
cacy of this restraint on individuals is well known. The conduct of every popular Assem-
bly, acting on oath, the strongest of religious ties, shews that individuals join without re-
morse in acts agst. which their consciences would revolt, if proposed to them separately 
in their closets. When Indeed Religion is kindled into enthusiasm, its force like that of 
other passions is increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But enthusiasm is only a tem-
porary state of Religion, and whilst it lasts will hardly be seen with pleasure at the helm. 
Even in its coolest state, it has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint 
from it. If then there must be different interests and parties in society; and a majority 
when united by a common interest or passion cannot be restrained from oppressing the 
minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government, where the majority 
must ultimately decide, but that of giving such an extent to its sphere, that no common 
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interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust pur-
suit. In a large Society, the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that a 
common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less likely to be 
formed, by a majority of the whole. The same security seems requisite for the civil as for 
the religious rights of individuals. If the same sect form a majority and have the power, 
other sects will be sure to be depressed. Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyran-
ny, is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be adminis-
tered on just principles. It must be observed however that this doctrine can only hold 
within a sphere of a mean extent. As in too small a sphere oppressive combinations may 
be too easily formed agst. the weaker party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert 
may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted with the admin-
istration. The great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sovereignty as that it 
may be sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society to controul one part 
from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, 
from setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society. In absolute monarchies, 
the Prince may be tolerably neutral towards different classes of his subjects but may sac-
rifice the happiness of all to his personal ambition or avarice. In small republics, the sov-
ereign will is controuled from such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently 
neutral towards the parts composing it. In the extended Republic of the United States, the 
General Government would hold a pretty even balance between the parties of particular 
States, and be at the same time sufficiently restrained by its dependence on the communi-
ty, from betraying its general interests. 
Begging pardon for this immoderate digression I return to the third object above 
mentioned . . . . 
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The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con-
tinued) 
 
To the People of the State of New York: 
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none 
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the vio-
lence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed 
for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous 
vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating 
the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injus-
tice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal 
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to 
be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most 
specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions 
on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; 
but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obvi-
ated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere 
heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and 
private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, 
that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are 
too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, 
but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously 
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we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will 
not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a can-
did review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been 
erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the 
same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; 
and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and 
alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. 
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which 
a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. 
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. 
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its 
causes; the other, by controlling its effects. 
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by de-
stroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen 
the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. 
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than 
the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly 
expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, 
because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is es-
sential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. 
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as 
the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions 
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will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, 
his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the for-
mer will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the facul-
ties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obsta-
cle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of gov-
ernment. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the 
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the 
influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a di-
vision of the society into different interests and parties. 
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them 
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circum-
stances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning 
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment 
to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of 
other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in 
turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered 
them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their 
common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, 
that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinc-
tions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent 
conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and 
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property 
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are 
debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a 
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity 
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in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different senti-
ments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the prin-
cipal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the neces-
sary and ordinary operations of the government. 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would cer-
tainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with 
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet 
what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determina-
tions, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of 
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates 
and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private 
debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the 
other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, 
themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most power-
ful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and 
in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be 
differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither 
with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the vari-
ous descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; 
yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are 
given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which 
they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. 
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing 
interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will 
not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all 
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without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail 
over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of anoth-
er or the good of the whole. 
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be re-
moved, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican 
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may 
clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and 
mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a 
faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure 
the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same 
time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to 
which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this 
form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long la-
bored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. 
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the 
existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevent-
ed, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their 
number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. 
If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither 
moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found 
to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in propor-
tion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes 
needful. 
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From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by 
which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and ad-
minister the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A 
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; 
a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is noth-
ing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. 
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and 
have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theo-
retic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously sup-
posed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, 
at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opin-
ions, and their passions. 
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation 
takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. 
Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall compre-
hend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. 
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, 
the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by 
the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over 
which the latter may be extended. 
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the pub-
lic views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wis-
dom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under 
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such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representa-
tives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the 
people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be in-
verted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by in-
trigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the 
interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics 
are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly 
decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: 
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the 
representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of 
a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in or-
der to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in 
the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being propor-
tionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be 
not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, 
and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. 
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of cit-
izens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candi-
dates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; 
and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who 
possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. 
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both 
sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of 
electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circum-
stances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached 
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to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The feder-
al Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate inter-
ests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures. 
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of terri-
tory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic govern-
ment; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to 
be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably 
will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and 
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller 
the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within 
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of op-
pression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade 
the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for 
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Be-
sides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of un-
just or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion 
to the number whose concurrence is necessary. 
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a 
democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small repub-
lic, -- is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in 
the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments ren-
der them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that 
the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. 
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the 
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event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree 
does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. 
Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplish-
ment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of 
the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, 
but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious 
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of 
sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any 
danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal 
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to per-
vade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion 
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. 
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the 
degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherish-
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